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We report evidence that bank liquidity ratios (liquid assets as a percentage of total
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as the economy grows, it becomes easier for the individuals to access the market, and the
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1 Introduction
An extensive empirical literature has showed how the “financial architecture” of an economy
(i.e., the mix of financial intermediation and markets) evolves during the process of economic
development, and might generate non-trivial feedback effects on the process itself. Despite
this, most of the times the theoretical literature on finance and growth has thought of the
financial sector just as a “black box” that simply allows individuals to pool risk among
themselves. With the present paper, we want to open that black box.
Our aim is twofold. First, we report evidence that the liquidity ratio (liquid assets as a
percentage of total assets) of financial intermediaries decreases during the process of economic
development. Second, we reconcile this evidence with (i) economic growth and (ii) two other
well-known facts about the evolution of the financial architecture during the process of devel-
opment: the increasing importance of financial markets, at the expenses of more traditional
financial intermediaries, and the increase of direct participation of individual investors into
them.
To this end, we build upon the idea that financial intermediaries (or more commonly,
“banks”) and markets compete in offering two types of services to the economy: insurance
against idiosyncratic shocks, and investment opportunities. Here we use the word “markets”
to identify all those investment opportunities that allow individuals to effectively by-pass the
banks to make their investments. For example, we can think of them as tax havens, or as
those institutions that provide banking services without being regulated as such, which have
been labeled “new financial intermediaries” or more recently “shadow banking system”.
More formally, we embed into a general equilibrium growth model the most standard
theory of financial intermediation and markets that the microeconomic literature gives us:
the one that goes back to the seminal work of Diamond and Dybvig (1983). In their world,
banks collect deposits and set up contracts providing insurance to their customers against
some liquidity shocks that make them “impatient” to consume. For a given amount deposited
wt, it is a well-known result that, with logarithmic utility, the bank offers to pay back exactly
wt to those customers who turn out to be impatient (i.e., banks never “break the buck”),
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and Rtwt to those who turn out to be patient, where Rt is the return on the capital that
banks lend to the production sector. It is also well-known that, in this environment, the
agents would get exactly the same consumption bundle {wt, Rtwt} (and, as a consequence,
the same expected welfare) by independently accessing the capital market and making their
own investment decision.1 Hence, the individuals are completely indifferent between these two
investment opportunities.
To break up this indifference, we tweak the environment in two directions. First, banks
pay an iceberg-type cost on the return on their capital investment. This cost can be seen as
emerging from regulation, limiting the ways banks can invest their capital, or as a technol-
ogy constraint. Moreover, by imposing it only onto banks, we replicate the preferential tax
treatment enjoyed by capital gains with respect to interests from deposits, that is typical of
many developing and developed countries (including the U.S.). Second, individuals who invest
directly in the market must pay a fixed entry cost. This can be seen as a transaction cost
or an institutional impediment that prevent individuals from accessing the market, and is a
tool that has been extensively used in the macroeconomic literature on finance and growth
(Acemoglu and Zilibotti, 1997; Townsend and Ueda, 2006).
The interplay between the bank iceberg cost and the individual fixed entry cost is at the
cornerstone of our analysis. We assume that the individuals engage in a discrete investment
decision, by choosing between investing in the bank or directly in the market, and thus show
how the competitive pressure from this alternative investment opportunity affects the bank
asset portfolio. Technically, we solve a banking problem, augmented with the imposition of a
participation constraint: the banking contract must be such that the depositors are in expec-
tation at least as well off as they would be by trading in the market.2 Depending on whether
this constraint is binding or not, we will have very different results. At low levels of develop-
ment, the salary of the individuals is not enough for them to afford the fixed cost to access
the market. Hence, the economy is in a pure banking equilibrium, in which we demonstrate
1This is a consequence of the assumption of logarithmic utility. In their original paper, Diamond and Dybvig
assume a strictly concave utility function with relative risk aversion larger than 1, and show that banks increase
expected welfare with respect to the market equilibrium by cross-subsidizing the (marginally more valuable)
impatient individuals.
2This is similar in spirit to the “disintermediation constraint” analyzed in Allen and Gale (1997).
3
that the bank liquidity ratio is constant in the long run. This result dramatically changes
as the economy grows, though. After a threshold, the salary that the individuals receive is
high enough so that the participation constraint binds. After this point, banks know that,
due to their technological/regulatory constraint, they cannot compete with the markets in
providing services to the patient individuals. Hence, they ensure participation by focusing on
“early” (impatient) consumption, i.e. they increase the amount of liquidity in their portfolios
relative to capital. This is an interesting result, because we find that in equilibrium banks
cross-subsidize the impatient depositors as a consequence not of their high risk aversion (as
in the original Diamond and Dybvig’s paper), but of competition and technology/regulation.
As the economy keeps growing, this bank “comparative advantage” in providing early
consumption disappears, as the fixed cost for the individuals to enter the market becomes
less and less important. Therefore, banks are forced to invest relatively more and more into
capital, i.e. the liquidity ratio goes down. This dynamic evolution gets to a point in which the
individual fixed cost becomes negligible, and banks cannot enforce participation any more:
the economy is in a pure market equilibrium from then onwards.
We are currently working on extending our analysis in two different directions, that we
will further characterize in future drafts of this paper. First, we want to relax the hypothesis
of discrete investment choice, and assume that individuals play a “financial lottery”. That
is, we allow the agents in the economy to randomize between banks and markets by playing
an individual-specific lottery, and insure against the resulting income risk in a perfectly com-
petitive insurance market, in a fashion similar to the “employment lotteries” pioneered by
Hansen (1985) and Rogerson (1988). In this way, we simultaneously characterize the invest-
ment decision of the banks, the behavior of the investors in the market, and the evolution
of the market participation rate. Moreover, we provide the base for some future extensions
of this environment, that can be possibly used to analyze issues like optimal taxation, or
calibrated to study the evolution of the financial architecture at business cycle frequencies.
Second, we want to validate our intuition that banks lower their liquidity ratios because
of the competitive pressure from the external investment opportunities available to their po-
tential customers. To this end, we make use of a database of bank liquid reserves, constructed
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by the World Bank for around 100 different countries for the period 1947-2003. We proxy the
availability of external investment channels with an index of securities market policy, provided
by the IMF, that increases as regulatory changes are imposed to advance the development
of markets. Our results show that a one-unit increase in this index leads to an average drop
in the bank liquidity ratio between 15 and 22 per cent. Moreover, we prove that this effect
is stable when controlling for other types of financial liberalizations, and highly nonlinear:
only an extensive process of markets liberalization has a significant effect on the behavior of
banks.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 and 3, we first summarize the
literature related to our work and the empirical evidence, respectively. In section 4, we describe
the economic environment of our model, and in section 5 we characterize its equilibrium. In
section 6, we show the results of our econometric analysis. In section 7, we go back to the
theory, and introduce financial lotteries. Finally, section 8 concludes.
2 Related Literature
Our paper contributes to several lines of research. First, it extends the literature on the evo-
lution of the roles of banks and financial markets, the so-called “financial architecture”. For
example, Gurley and Shaw (1955) are the first to point out the increasing importance of mar-
kets during the process of economic development. Song and Thakor (2010) study a mechanism
according to which the interaction between banks and markets is based not only on competi-
tion, but also on complementarity and co-evolution. These considerations lie on an extensive
empirical literature.3 The work of Demirguc-Kunt et al. (2012) is only the last example of a
series of papers that finds that, as a country develops, the size of both banks and securities
markets increase. The authors also find that the association between economic growth and an
increase in securities market development increases through time, thus reinforcing the view
that the role of markets become more and more important.
Despite the extension of the empirical analysis, not many authors have focused on ex-
plaining the mechanism underlying the evolution of the financial architecture, Boyd and
3See Levine (2005) for a survey.
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Smith (1998) and Deidda and Fattouh (2008) being two notable exceptions. They both study
environments in which asymmetric information about the profitability of an investment oppor-
tunity pushes for some costly state verification. Boyd and Smith (1998) use this assumption
to analyze the evolution of debt and equity markets, while Deidda and Fattouh (2008) instead
point their attention at the interactions between banks who gather information and disclosure
laws in the stock markets. Our work differs from theirs in three respects. First, we do not
explain the coexistence of banks and markets with the need for monitoring, but instead focus
on the willingness of individual investors to insure themselves against idiosyncratic shocks, as
in the seminal work by Diamond and Dybvig (1983). Second, we aim at jointly explaining the
evolution of financial architecture and of the bank asset portfolios. Third, we use a different
environment to answer our question, by embedding a standard microfounded model of bank-
ing into an equally standard neoclassical growth model. In that sense, our work is inspired
by some dynamic models of banking used in different set-ups in the literature (Bencivenga
and Smith, 1991; Qi, 1994; Ennis and Keister, 2003; Gaytan and Ranciere, 2006), which here
are extended by considering commitment problems similar to those in Thomas and Worrall
(1988).
Finally, by studying the evolution of the financial system during the process of economic
development, the present paper bridges two important strands of macroeconomic research:
finance and growth, and structural change. The literature on the first one finds its corner-
stone in the work of Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990), and focuses on the role of increasing
individual participation in the financial system as a mechanism to enhance growth (Khan,
2001) and risk diversification (Acemoglu and Zilibotti, 1997), and to affect income inequalities
(Townsend and Ueda, 2006). The second one instead points its attention to some unbalanced
features of the economy in the process of development, as highlighted by the seminal works of
Kuznets (1966) and Baumol (1967), and in more recent paper by Ngai and Pissarides (2007)
and Acemoglu and Guerrieri (2008).
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3 Empirical Evidence
In this section, we provide some evidence showing that a decreasing liquidity ratio in the
financial system is a general characteristic of the process of economic growth. In figure 1, we
plot a measure of relative liquidity of U.S. financial businesses: liquid assets as a percentage
of total liabilities. Following a common practice in the literature, we define liquid assets as
the sum of vault cash, excess and required reserves, and Treasury bonds.4 The series exhibits
a significant downward trend: it started at around 40 percent in the 1950s, and fell to a level
lower than 5 percent in the 2000s. The average growth rate is -3.34% while, even after the steep
decline of the period 1950-1970, relative liquidity has decreased at an average rate of -2.40%.5
These observations are robust to an alternative specification of the liquidity ratio, that is also
used in the literature: in figure 2, we substitute total financial assets at the denominator, and
we find a pattern that is qualitatively identical to the original one.
It can be argued that the downward trend in the liquidity ratio is a consequence of an
underlying downward trend in the relative price of liquidity. In order to rule out this argument,
we proxy the relative price of liquidity with the inverse of the compounded return on a 10-
year U.S. Treasury bond, relative to the return on the S&P500. From figure 3, it is evident
that the series has decreased in the period 1970-2010. This pattern was expected, given that
it reflects the fall of the equity risk premium, which is a well-known phenomenon and has
been extensively analyzed in the past.6 What is interesting to notice here is that the fall in
the relative price of liquidity has been quantitatively negligible: its average growth rate is
just -0.06%. This allows us to rule out any considerations regarding prices, and focus on the
behavior of economic agents in the following sections.
Finally, the decreasing liquidity in the financial system is not a phenomenon that exclu-
sively regards the United States. In figure 4, we plot a measure of relative liquidity, calculated
4According to the IMF, such a measure “provides an indication of the liquidity available to meet expected
and unexpected demands for cash. The level of liquidity indicates the ability of the deposit-taking sector to
withstand shocks to their balance sheet”.
5There exists also some evidence for the period 1880-1910, derived from Weber (2000). We find that the
liquidity ratio of the U.S. commercial banks, after a steep decline in the first ten years of the sample (from
36 to 20 percent) has stayed almost constant for the following twenty years, fluctuating between 20 and 26
percent. The data are available on request.
6Jagannathan et al. (2000); Lettau et al. (2008)
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by the Bank of England for the United Kingdom, and show that even this series exhibits a
negative average growth rate (-6.64%), with a sharp decline in the Seventies, and a continuing
downward trend in the following years. There exists some strong evidence at a cross-sectional
level, too. In a sample of 100 countries in the period 1970-2010, low-income countries have
on average an amount of bank liquid reserves (as a percentage of total assets) of around 26.3
percent, versus 18.2 percent for middle income countries, and 8.6 percent for high-income
countries.7 This pattern has been consistent throughout our sample. In figure 5, we plot the
bank liquid reserves as a percentage of total assets in the available years, and show that in
every period the higher the income is, the lower the amount of relative liquidity.
4 The Model
4.1 Preferences, Endowments and Technology
Time is infinite and discrete. The economy is populated by a series of 2-period-living over-
lapping generations. At each point in time, a new cohort is born, represented by a unitary
continuum of identical individuals. Each individuals is endowed with one unit of labor when
born, and zero units in the second period of the lifetime.
Individual preferences take the following form:
U(ctt, c
t
t+1, θ) = (1− θ)log(c
t
t) + θlog(c
t
t+1),
where the superscript indicates the birth date, and the subscript the period in which the
individuals consume. The parameter θ represents a preference shock, that takes values 0 with
probability π, and 1 with probability (1 − π). Shocks are independent across individuals,
idiosyncratic, and publicly revealed at the end of period t8. Their role is to affect the point
in time at which individuals are willing to consume. Thus, in line with the literature, we
define type-0 individuals as “impatient”, and type-1 individuals are “patient”. The presence
of a continuum of individuals implies that the law of large numbers holds, so the probability
7Source: World Development Indicators, World Bank; International Financial Statistics, IMF.
8By assuming that the preference shocks are publicly revealed, we implicitly rule out bank run equilibria,
whose effects on growth are analyzed by Ennis and Keister (2003) and Gaytan and Ranciere (2006).
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distribution of the preference shock is equivalent to its cross-sectional distribution.
In order to finance their consumption in t and t+1, two different technologies are available.
The first one is employed by a perfectly competitive firm, and is represented by a neoclassical
production function yt = f(Kt, AtLt), with constant returns to scale, f
′ > 0 and f ′′ < 0.
Labor, inelastically provided9 by the newborn cohort at each point in time, is augmented
by the exogenous technological process At, and yields an immediate return (i.e., a salary)
wt = Atf2(Kt, AtLt). Capital instead needs “time to build”: the amount invested in t − 1
matures only in t, yields a return rt = f1(Kt, AtLt), and then fully depreciates. Importantly,
we rule out intergenerational transfers, i.e. there exists no mechanism to transfer the return
on capital received by the current old cohort to the current impatient individuals. This hy-
pothesis, together with time to build, ensures that capital will only be held ex post by patient
individuals. Therefore, there exists a role for a second technology to finance the consumption
of those who turn out to be impatient: we call it “liquidity”. This is simply a storage tech-
nology, that yields one unit of the consumption good for each unit invested at the beginning
of the period.
4.2 Investment Opportunities
The preference structure and the available technologies imply that the individuals in this
economy must make a non-trivial investment decision: once they receive their salaries, they
decide their holdings of liquidity and capital, before knowing if they turn out to be patient
or impatient (because the idiosyncratic shock is revealed at the end of period t). In order to
do this, there are two investment channels that can be exploited: the individuals can directly
trade in the markets, or they can negotiate a deposit contract with a bank, before the markets
open. This investment decision is discrete, i.e. individuals either deposit their salary in the
banks or invest it all in the market, and is taken without commitment: individuals can always
renege on the banking contract and choose the market, instead. More formally, the investment
choice is governed by the dummy variable φt, which takes value 1 if the individuals invest
in the market, or 0 if they go to the banks. We relax the hypothesis of discrete investment
9Because individuals do not enjoy utility from leisure.
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choice in section 7, where we introduce financial lotteries.
When the individuals invest in the market, they take their own investment decisions, after
the payment of a fixed cost ξ. The problem in the market then reads as follows:
V M (wt, rt+1, pt) = max
{xt
t
,xt
t+1
,zM
t
,kM
t+1
}
πlog(xtt) + (1− π)log(x
t
t+1), (1)
subject to:
zMt + k
M
t+1 = wt − ξ, (2)
zMt + ptk
M
t+1 = x
t
t, (3)
Rrt+1
(
kMt+1 +
zMt
pt
)
= xtt+1. (4)
Individuals choose how much to consume in t and t + 1 and their holding of liquidity
and capital (zMt and k
M
t+1, respectively) to maximize their expected welfare, subject to the
budget constraints. At time t, they get a salary wt, pay the fixed entry cost ξ, and invest
what remains in liquidity and capital. At the end of t, they all get to know their individual
types, and a secondary market opens, in which individuals can exchange liquidity and capital
at price pt. This means that the consumption of the impatient individuals (at t) will be equal
to the liquidity held (zMt ), plus the proceedings that they earn from selling their holdings of
capital (ptk
M
t+1). Similarly, the consumption of the patient individuals (at t+1) will be equal
to the return on the capital invested in t (Rrt+1k
M
t+1), plus the return on the capital bought in
the secondary market with their holding of liquidity (Rrt+1z
M
t /pt). R is a scaling parameter,
whose importance will be explained soon. Individuals are price-takers, so the total welfare
VM that they enjoy from directly trading in the market is a function of the salary wt, of the
return on capital rt+1, and of the price pt in the secondary market, which are determined in
equilibrium.
The second channel that individuals can employ to make their investments is through
financial intermediation. That is, we assume that the economy is populated by a banking
sector, in which a large number of 2-period-lived banks compete in order to maximize their
profits. To this end, they collect deposits at zero costs, and invest them in liquidity and
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capital.
In order for this portfolio problem to be interesting, we need three assumptions. First,
we impose that the banks pay an iceberg cost τ on the return on the invested capital Rrt.
Second, the parameter R is such that (1 − τ)Rrt > 1: if that was not the case, the banks
would invest all their capital in liquidity, and roll it over for two periods to finance late
consumption.10 Third, there exists a technology through which the banks can liquidate their
capital investment before its due maturity, but its return is lower than unity: in this way,
the banks are forced to hold liquidity to finance early consumption.11 Finally, we assume free
entry, so that bank profits in equilibrium are zero, and we can focus on a representative bank
solving the dual problem:
max
{ct
t
,ct
t+1
,zB
t
,kB
t+1
}
πlog(ctt) + (1− π)log(c
t
t+1), (5)
subject to the budget constraints:
zBt + k
B
t+1 = wt, (6)
zBt = πc
t
t, (7)
(1− τ)Rrt+1k
B
t+1 = (1− π)c
t
t+1, (8)
and to the participation constraint:
πlog(ctt) + (1− π)log(c
t
t+1) ≥ V
M (wt, rt+1, pt). (9)
The representative bank exploits the law of large numbers to choose how to optimally invest
the total deposits in liquidity and capital, so as to maximize the depositors’ welfare.12 The
total amount of liquidity zBt is employed to pay consumption c
t
t to π impatient individuals.
Similarly, the return on the total capital invested (1 − τ)Rrt+1k
B
t+1 is employed to pay con-
10Incidentally, we can choose R to be high enough to ensure that ctt+1 ≥ c
t
t, so that our results do not change
even when the realization of the idiosyncratic types is private information.
11Notice that we rule out the possibility for banks to trade claims to capital in the secondary market, as the
individuals do. Bencivenga and Smith (1991) extensively comment on the rationale for such a restriction.
12We choose a logarithmic felicity function for simplicity. All the results presented here would go through if
we assumed a standard CRRA functional form.
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sumption ctt+1 to (1− π) patient individuals. The assumption made above about the absence
of a system of intergenerational transfers calls for the assumption of 2-period-lived banks.13
Finally, the deposit contract {ctt, c
t
t+1} must be such that the individuals have no incentive
to renege and invest in the market. This is ensured with the imposition of the participation
constraint in (9).
With these descriptions in hand, we are ready to define the object of our analysis, that
we call “banking equilibrium”:
Definition 1. Given an initial value K0, a banking equilibrium is a price vector {rt, wt, pt},
a bank portfolio strategy {zBt , k
B
t+1} and a deposit contract {c
t
t, c
t
t+1}, an individual portfolio
strategy {zMt , k
M
t+1} and a consumption allocation {x
t
t, x
t
t+1}, a participation choice φt ∈ {0, 1},
and production inputs {Kt, Lt} for every t = 0, 1, . . . such that:
• For given prices, the deposit contract and the bank portfolio strategy solve the banking
problem in (5);
• For given prices, the consumption allocation and the individual portfolio strategy solve
the problem in the market in (1);
• For given prices, the production inputs maximize firm profits;
• Markets clear:
Kt = (1− φt)k
B
t + φtk
M
t ,
Lt = 1.
The previous definition is standard. The only thing to notice is that, given that the
individual investment choice is discrete, the total capital in the economy comes all either in
form of bank credit or in form of equity. Moreover, labor supply is inelastic, so in equilibrium
the total labor is fixed, and equal to 1.
13Qi (1994) develops an overlapping generation model with financial intermediation similar to ours, but in
which an infinitely lived bank operates as a social planner and does allow intergenerational transfers. The
author shows that in this environment the bank optimally chooses to keep no liquidity in its portfolio. Since
our focus is also on the evolution of the bank asset portfolios, we rule out such a case.
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4.3 Timing
To conclude this section, we sum up the timing of actions. In each period t, (i) the represen-
tative bank negotiates a deposit contract with the newborn generation, stating the amount of
consumption goods that it will receive at the end of period t and at t+1; (ii) production takes
place, with the capital cumulated by the patient individuals born at t−1 (which characterizes
the state of the economy) and the labor provided by the newborn cohort; (iii) the patient in-
dividuals from period t−1 consume the return on capital rt, and the young individuals receive
the salary wt and decide whether to renege on the banking contract; (iv) types are publicly
revealed; (v) the secondary market for capital opens; (vi) impatient individuals consume.
4.4 Unconstrained Banking Equilibrium
As a benchmark to the main problem, we start our analysis with the characterization of
the unconstrained banking equilibrium. That is, we solve the problem in (5), subject only
to the budget constraints (6)-(8): the representative bank collects the wages, and invests
them in liquidity and capital on behalf of their customers, so as to have the right amount of
consumption good at t and t+ 1. Call the expected welfare from this problem V BU . From the
date-t budget constraint, it is easy to see that in the long run it must be the case that liquidity,
capital investment and salaries (and as a consequence, production) grow at the same rate,
and the liquidity ratio Lt ≡ z
B
t /wt is constant. We summarize this result in the following:
Lemma 1. In the unconstrained banking equilibrium, the liquidity ratio is constant in the
long run.
Proof. In the text above. 
The equilibrium of this environment is characterized by the resource constraint of the
economy (equivalent to the budget constraint of the bank) and by the Euler equation:
u′
(
wt(Kt)−Kt+1
π
)
= (1− τ)Rrt+1(Kt+1)u
′
(
(1− τ)Rrt+1(Kt+1)Kt+1
1− π
)
. (10)
This is an implicit difference equation that regulates the evolution of the total capital in the
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economy. Notice that in this environment we only have intermediated capital, so the market
clearing condition implies that Kt = k
B
t . With a logarithmic felicity function, a closed-form
solution can be found, in which the liquidity ratio Lt is constant at every point in time (also
during the transition), and equal to π. This is a consequence of the fact that the income and
substitution effects cancel out, thus any change in the return on capital does not affect the
relative allocation of the initial portfolio.
With relative risk aversion larger than 1, as in the original Diamond and Dybvig’s paper,
a closed-form solution of the Euler equation in (10) is instead not possible. Nevertheless,
an interesting result emerges from the numerical analysis: the income effect dominates the
substitution effect. This means that, as the economy grows and capital increases, rt decreases
and the bank rebalances its portfolio by relatively increasing its investment in capital. That
is, the liquidity ratio decreases in the transition, as showed in figure 6.14
5 The Banking Equilibrium
The first step in the characterization of the banking equilibrium defined above is the solution
to the problem in the market. We enunciate a key result, that holds true in any case analyzed
here, in the following lemma:
Lemma 2. In every banking equilibrium, pt = 1.
Proof. In Appendix B. 
The intuition for this result is simple: given that the individuals are all ex ante equal, the
only possible equilibrium is one in which they are also ex ante indifferent between holding
liquidity and capital. If that was not the case, everyone would invest only in one of the
two assets, and the secondary market would not clear. Despite this indeterminacy, we use the
budget constraints in (2)-(4) and still characterize the consumption allocation that individuals
gets in the market, which is xtt = wt − ξ and x
t
t+1 = Rrt+1(wt − ξ).
14We assume a Cobb-Douglas production function yt = K
α
t (AtLt)
1−α, with At = (1 + γ)
t, and felicity
function of the form u(c) = c1−σ/(1 − σ). The parameters of the model are as follows: α = .4, γ = .0193,
τ = .1, pi = .15, R = 2.5, σ = 3.
14
This result formally shows where the inefficiency of the market solution comes from:
prices do not reflect the willingness to smooth consumption across time, as a consequence of
the fact that the economic agents do not have access to a complete set of state-contingent
claims.15 In the literature on financial intermediation, these considerations provide a rationale
for the emergence of a banking equilibrium, equivalent to our unconstrained equilibrium,
which dominates the market solution (Diamond and Dybvig, 1983). Here instead the presence
of the bank iceberg-type cost and of the market entry cost allows us to rule out this dominance,
because it makes the bank compete with an institution (i.e., the market) that in all effects
employs a different technology. For the banks to react to the presence of markets, we then need
to impose that VM > V BU , i.e. that individuals would rather invest in the market unless the
banks change their behavior. These considerations lead us to impose the following constraint:
Assumption 1. wt >
ξ
1−(1−τ)1−pi
≡ w∗.
To find the solution to the constrained problem, we plug the budget constraints (6)-(8) and
the market allocation {xtt, x
t
t+1} derived above into the participation constraint, and assume
that, if the individuals are indifferent between staying with their banks and going to the
market, they will choose the first option (hence φt = 0), so that by market clearing Kt = k
B
t .
Therefore, we derive the following:
Proposition 1. In the constrained banking equilibrium, the law of motion of capital is given
by:
[wt(Kt)−Kt+1]
piK1−pit+1 = Ψ
[
wt(Kt)− ξ
]
, (11)
15As highlighted by Wallace (1988), the restriction on the individual access to state-contingent claims nat-
urally arises in every model in which financial intermediation plays a role. Assume that such a market exists:
individuals pay q1 and q2 to buy two assets that pay 1 unit of consumption at the end of period t if they turn
out to be impatient and patient, respectively (if they turn out to be patient, individuals store that unit of
consumption to the following period). The maximization problem reads:
max piu(ct) + (1− pi)u(ct+1),
subject to:
q1pic
t
t + q2(1− pi)ctt+1 = wt − ξ
By a no arbitrage condition, it must be the case that Rrt+1/pt = 1/q2, and that q1 = 1. Hence, from the
optimality conditions it comes out that the price in the secondary market should be:
pt = Rrt+1q2 = Rrt+1
u′(ct+2)
u′(ct+1)
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where:
Ψ ≡
πpi(1− π)1−pi
(1− τ)1−pi
.
Proof. In the text above. 
This is an implicit difference equation characterizing the amount of capital in t+ 1, as a
function of the current state of the economy (the amount of capital Kt), of the idiosyncratic
demand for liquidity π, and of the technological parameters τ and ξ. In figure 7, we show a
typical pattern for the evolution of capital and liquidity ratio in this environment.16
From this proposition, we can derive a series of important corollaries that characterize the
evolution of the bank portfolio allocation. We enunciate and comment them all together:
Corollary 1. In the constrained banking equilibrium:
1. The liquidity ratio Lt is strictly larger than π;
2. The liquidity ratio Lt is decreasing;
3. Asymptotically, there exists no constrained banking equilibrium.
Proof. In Appendix B. 
The intuition for these results is the following. Once the market channel is available, the
bank knows that it cannot compete with it in offering services to the patient individuals,
due to the technological/regulatory constraint that prevents the bank from fully enjoying the
yields on its capital investment. This means that the bank optimally chooses to ensure partic-
ipation by focusing on the impatient individuals, and invests relatively more than necessary
in liquidity. Incidentally, notice that here the cross-subsidization of the early consumption
emerges in equilibrium, but not as a consequence of high risk aversion as in the original
Diamond and Dybvig’s paper, but as a consequence of the interplay between technological
constraints and competition from the market.
As the economy grows, the bank “comparative advantage” in the provision of liquidity
becomes less and less important, because the fixed cost to enter the market becomes more
16We make the same assumptions as in figure 6 regarding the parameterization of the numerical simulation.
See note 14 for the details.
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and more negligible. Hence, in order to ensure participation, the bank is forced to increase its
investment in capital relative to liquidity, i.e. to lower its liquidity ratio. At infinity, individuals
in the market do not “break the buck”, i.e. the return on their portfolio is such that they get
at least as much as their initial investment (in present value), regardless of the realization of
their idiosyncratic type. To ensure participation, the bank then needs to provide the same
type of service, so it invests an amount πwt of deposits in liquidity, and pay c
t
t = wt to the
impatient depositors. In this way, it is left with an amount of capital equal to (1−π)wt, which
is not enough to avoid breaking the buck with the patient depositors, since
ct
t+1/Rrt+1
wt
= (1−τ)
is less than 1.
6 Econometric Analysis
The main result of the previous sections highlights a mechanism to explains the decreasing
trend in the bank liquidity ratios that we observe in the data: banks lower the relative amount
of liquid assets in their portfolios to keep up with the competitive pressure coming from other
channels that their potential customers can employ to hedge against idiosyncratic uncertainty.
The aim of this section is to go back to the data, and test the validity of this rationale by
estimating the following equation:
log(liqratioit) = β0 + β1SMPit + β2 log(RGDPit) + β3Xit + µi + µt + ǫit.
We want to exploit the panel dimension of the database of bank relative liquidity that
we briefly analyzed in section 3. Thus, our dependent variable liqratio is defined as the ratio
of domestic currency holdings and deposits with the monetary authorities to claims on other
governments, nonfinancial public enterprises, the private sector, and other banking institu-
tions. As we mentioned earlier, this is a commonly-used indicator of the liquidity available to
the banks to meet expected and unexpected demands for cash.17
As independent variable, we instead need a real-world equivalent of the exogenous fixed
cost ξ, which again we see as an intrinsic transaction cost or institutional impediment that
17Source: World Bank. More details are available in Appendix ??.
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affects the possibility of accessing the alternative market channel. We find one in the database
of financial reforms produced by the IMF (Abiad et al., 2008), that covers various regulatory
changes affecting the financial system (credit controls, interest rate controls, entry barriers,
state ownership, etc.) in around 90 countries for the period 1970-2008. In particular, we use
the variable labeled “Securities market policy” (SMP ), which is an index summarizing all
the regulatory interventions that make the access to security markets easier.18 The index
takes value 0 if a securities market does not exist, and increases in discrete steps up to 3, as
the system becomes fully liberalized. The prediction from our theory says that, as the access
to the market becomes easier (i.e., the index of securities market policy increases) the bank
liquidity ratios should decrease.
We also add to the analysis a series of controls. First, since the theory predicts the liquidity
ratios to decrease with economic development, we add as regressor the real GDP per capita.
Second, since the process of financial liberalization almost never pertained only one part of
the financial system, but generally came as a wave of complex regulation (and deregulation)
of various aspects of the system itself, we want to test whether the evolution of our securities
market policy index does not reflect some broader regulatory changes. Hence, we include as
controls other measures of financial liberalization: the indices of credit controls and banking
sector supervision drawn from the same IMF database, and the Chinn-Ito measure of openness
in capital account transactions (Chinn and Ito, 2008). Finally, to take care of any other
country-specific characteristic that might influence the bank liquidity ratio, we estimate a
fixed effect model, and add time dummies:
We report our results in table 1. The coefficient on securities market policy is significant
and has the expected sign (column 1): a one-unit increase in the index leads to a drop in
the bank liquidity ratio of around 21.8 per cent. The inclusion of real GDP as a regressor
affects neither the significance nor the magnitude of the coefficient in a notable way (column
2). Instead, once we control for other forms of financial liberalization (columns 3 to 5), the
coefficient slightly falls, while still being highly significant: at its lowest estimate, a one-unit
18According to the authors, these include “[...] the auctioning of government securities, establishment of
debt and equity markets, and policies to encourage development of these markets, such as tax incentives or
developments of depository and settlement systems”.
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increase in the index leads to a drop in the bank liquidity ratio of around 14.9 per cent.
In order to further analyze the connection between securities market liberalization and
the bank liquidity ratio, we split our indicator into four dummy variables, corresponding
to the four values that it takes in the data. Then, we study the nonlinear effects of financial
liberalization both directly onto the bank liquidity ratio and indirectly, through the interaction
of the dummies with real GDP. The results are reported in table 2. The first two columns show
that the negative average effect found in the previous table kicks in only when an extensive
process of securities market liberalization is implemented: moving the index from 0 to 2 would
lead to a drop in the bank liquidity ratio of almost 24 per cent, while moving from 0 to 3 would
lead to a drop of around 35 per cent. The introduction of very mild reforms (i.e. moving the
index from 0 to 1) has instead an insignificant effect, and tends to increase the bank liquidity
ratio. These results find confirmation when we interact the dummies with real GDP: moving
the index from 0 to 2 would increase the negative effect of GDP on the liquidity ratio by
around 3.8 percentage points, while moving from 0 to 3 would increase the negative effect
by more than 5.7 per cent. Moving from 0 to 1 would instead have an effect not statistically
distinguishable from nihil.
7 Financial Lotteries
In this section, we go back to our theory, and relax the hypothesis of discrete investment
choice. Specifically, we introduce the possibility for the individuals to play a financial lottery,
i.e. we assume that each newborn agent, after receiving her salary but before investing it,
plays an individual-specific lottery, in which with probability φt ∈ [0, 1] she goes to the
market, and with probability (1− φt) she makes a deposit into the bank. Thus, in all effects
the individuals are randomizing between the bank and the market, as they do between working
and not working in the seminal paper by Rogerson (1988). The law of large number holds, so
φt also represents the participation rate in the market.
In order to insure against the income risk generated by the lottery, the individuals purchase
an insurance in a perfectly competitive insurance sector, in which the relative price of the
market outcome versus the bank outcome is φt/(1−φt). More formally, the investment problem
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reads:
max
{Xt
t
,Xt
t+1
,
Ct
t
,Ct
t+1
,φt}
φt
[
πu(Xtt ) + (1− π)u(X
t
t+1)
]
+ (1− φt)
[
πu(Ctt ) + (1− π)u(C
t
t+1)
]
, (12)
subject to:
φtX
t
t + (1− φt)C
t
t ≤ φt(wt − ξ) + (1− φt)c
t
t, (13)
φtX
t
t+1 + (1− φt)C
t
t+1 ≤ φtRrt+1(wt − ξ) + (1− φt)c
t
t+1, (14)
and 0 ≤ φt ≤ 1. Individuals choose the probability of investing in the market and in the bank,
and how much to consume in the two following periods in the two cases: {Xtt ,X
t
t+1} if they go
to the market, and {Ctt , C
t
t+1} if they go to the bank. The expected liquid resources available
at the end of period t are on the right hand side of (13): with probability φt the individuals
go to the market and get (wt − ξ), and with probability (1− φt) they go to the bank and get
ctt (fixed by the banking contract). Similarly, the right hand side of (14) gives the expected
resources available in period t+1. These are used to purchase the bundle {Xtt ,X
t
t+1} at price
φt, and the bundle {C
t
t , C
t
t+1} at price (1− φt), on the left hand sides of (13) and (14).
The hypothesis of perfect competition in the insurance market allows perfect insurance
against the income fluctuations generated by the lottery, hence:
Lemma 3. In each equilibrium with financial lotteries, Xtt = C
t
t and X
t
t+1 = C
t
t+1.
Proof. In Appendix B. 
This result greatly simplifies the problem, that now reads:
max πu(Ctt) + (1− π)u(C
t
t+1), (15)
subject to:
Ctt ≤ φt(wt − ξ) + (1− φt)c
t
t, (16)
Ctt+1 ≤ φtRrt+1(wt − ξ) + (1− φt)c
t
t+1, (17)
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and 0 ≤ φt ≤ 1. We focus on an interior solution. We provide the characterization of the
equilibrium of this economy in the following proposition:
Proposition 2. The allocation of the banking equilibrium with financial lotteries satisfies the
optimality conditions:
πu′
(
Ctt
) [
ctt − (wt − ξ)
]
= (1− π)u′
(
Ctt+1
) [
Rrt+1(wt − ξ)− c
t
t+1
]
, (18)
u′
(
ctt
)
= (1− τ)Rrt+1u
′
(
ctt+1
)
. (19)
Proof. In Appendix B. 
These two expressions, together with the budget constraints and the price equations, fully
characterize the banking equilibrium with financial lotteries. The first equation regulates the
choice between investing in the market or in the bank. Each individual optimally chooses her
own participation rate φt so as to equalize the expected marginal costs and benefits of her
decision. The expected marginal cost is on the left hand side of (18): with probability π, the
individual turns out impatient and, if she invests one marginal unit in the market, she loses
the extra utility coming from the cross-subsidization offered by the bank (
[
ctt − (wt − ξ)
]
).
The expected marginal benefit of participating in the market is instead on the right hand
side of (18): with probability (1− π), the individual turns out patient and, if she invests one
marginal unit in the market, she gets the extra return
[
Rrt+1(wt − ξ)− c
t
t+1
]
. The second
equation instead regulates the portfolio allocation of the banks: they choose the contract
{ctt, c
t
t+1} so as to satisfy an Euler equation, as in the unconstrained banking equilibrium. This
also means that, having depositors gained a further degree of freedom through the possibility
to randomize, the bank can allocate its capital by equalizing early and late consumers at the
margin. As a consequence, the evolution of its portfolio of assets will again depend on the
interplay of income and substitution effects.
The equilibrium dynamics of this economy is driven by the fact that the participation
rate affects the prices (specifically, the return on capital), which affect the bank portfolio,
which in turn affects the participation rate back. This means that, in general, a closed form
solution for the system cannot be found. Thus, we characterize the equilibrium in a numerical
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example. We impose a CRRA functional form for the felicity function u(·), with relative
risk aversion equal to 3. The probability of being impatient is π = .15, roughly equivalent
to the average bank liquidity ratio among the U.S. financial businesses in our sample. The
production function is assumed to be a standard Cobb-Douglas yt = K
α
t (AtLt)
1−α, with the
exogenous labor-augmenting technology being the deterministic process At = A0(1 + γ)
t. We
choose α = .4, A0 = .1 and γ = .0193, equal to the average growth rate of U.S. GDP in
the period 1970-2010. Finally, as far as the institutional parameters are concerned, we pick
R = 2.5, and τ = ξ = .1.
The results are reported in figure 8. As the economy grows, the fixed cost ξ to access
the market becomes more and more negligible, hence the participation rate increases (panel
A). The increasing capital accumulation leads to a decreasing return on capital, that affects
the bank portfolio in the expected way: the income effect dominates the substitution effect
(because agents are more risk averse than log), hence a decreasing return on capital pushes
banks to lower their liquidity ratios, i.e. the per capita amount of capital invested by the
banks gets relatively bigger than the amount of liquidity (panel B).
In the last three panels of figure 8, we analyze the evolution of private credit and equity
capital, defined as the total amount of capital provided by the banks and by the market,
respectively. By definition, the first one is equal to KBt = (1− φt)k
B
t , and the second is equal
to KMt = φt(1−π)(wt−ξ). Clearly, the per capita bank capital k
B
t , the salary wt and the total
amount of capital in the economy Kt must grow at the same rate of GDP. Therefore, equity
capital grows faster than total capital and GDP because of the increasing participation rate
(panel C and E). On the contrary, private credit grows slower than GDP, and as a consequence
private credit as a percentage of GDP falls (panel D).19 We can conclude that the model is
able to replicate, at least qualitatively, the three stylized facts highlighted at the beginning
of the paper: increasing market participation, decreasing bank liquidity ratio, and increasing
importance of equity capital.
19This last result is at odds with some empirical observations, finding that private credit and equity capital
are often complementary (Beck et al., 2000), but is an obvious consequence of the increasing participation
rate and of the fact that the two channels (banks and markets) here compete for the collection of individual
savings.
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8 Concluding Remarks
In the present paper, we develop a theory of finance and growth to jointly explain (i) the
decreasing liquidity ratio of financial institutions and (ii) some well-known stylized facts
on the evolution of the architecture of the financial system during the process of economic
development. We characterize the equilibrium of a growth model, in which banks and markets
play a key role, by competing for the provision of insurance services and fruitful investment
opportunities to the savers, and show that the competitive pressure from the markets pushes
banks to lower their liquidity ratios. We also find evidence of such a mechanism being into
place in the real world: a one-unit increase in the index of securities market liberalization
(that we take as a proxy for the market entry costs) leads to a drop in the bank liquidity
ratio between 15 and 22 percentage points.
To conclude, we believe that out work is interesting because it allows us to have a first
look at a class of models that, despite its simplicity, can be used in the future to answer very
different questions. For example, we think of studying optimal Ramsey taxation, and find
the optimal mix of taxes on capital gains and on interests on deposits. We can also extend
this environment by formally modelling financial innovation: for example, we can endogenize
the bank technological/regulatory constraint τ and the market entry cost ξ by introducing
search in the capital markets. We can also run a growth accounting exercise, to quantitatively
evaluate the contribution of intermediaries and markets on the observed growth rate of GDP,
or feed the model with high frequency shocks and study its business cycle properties. These
two last extensions would require the abandonment of the current OLG structure, that is not
well-suited for a quantitative analysis, in favor of a representative agents set-up. We leave all
these considerations for future research.
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Appendices
A Data Appendix
• Bank Supervision: Index of banking sector supervision. It is the sum of three indices,
normalized on a 0-3 scale. It includes: a dummy indicating with 1 when a country
adopted a capital adequacy ratio based on the Basel standard; an index of independence
of the banking supervisory agency, on a 0-2 scale; an index of effectiveness of banking
supervision, on a 0-2 scale. Source: IMF (Abiad et al., 2008).
• Credit Controls: Index of credit controls and reserve requirements. It is the sum of
three indices, normalized on a 0-3 scale. It includes: an index of restrictiveness of reserve
requirements, on a 0-2 scale; a dummy indicating with 1 if mandatory credit allocations
to certain sectors are eliminated or do not exist; a dummy indicating with 1 when the
mandatory requirement of credit allocation at subsidized rates is eliminated or banks
do not have to supply credits at subsidized rates. Source: IMF (Abiad et al., 2008).
• Financial Openness: The Chinn-Ito index of financial openness. It is based on the
binary dummy variables that codify the tabulation of restrictions on cross-border fi-
nancial transactions reported in the IMFs Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements
and Exchange Restrictions. The data are available for the period 1970 to 2010, for 182
countries. Source: Chinn and Ito (2008).
• liqratio: Bank liquid reserves to bank assets ratio (%). It is the ratio of domestic
currency holdings and deposits with the monetary authorities to claims on other gov-
ernments, nonfinancial public enterprises, the private sector, and other banking institu-
tions. Data are available for the period 1947 to 2003, for 106 countries. Source: World
Development Indicators, World Bank, and International Financial Statistics, IMF.
• Real GDP: PPP Converted GDP Per Capita (Chain Series), at 2005 constant prices.
Data are available for the period 1950 to 2009, for 189 countries. Source: Penn World
Tables (Heston et al., 2011).
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• Securities Market Policy: Index of securities market liberalization. It takes value 0
if a securities market does not exist; 1 when a securities market is starting to form with
the introduction of auctioning of T-bills or the establishment of a security commission;
2 when further measures have been taken to develop securities markets (tax exemp-
tions, introduction of median and long-term government bonds in order to build the
benchmark of a yield curve, policies to develop corporate bond and equity markets, or
the introduction of a primary dealer system to develop government security markets);
3 when further policy measures have been taken to develop derivative markets or to
broaden the institutional investor base by deregulating portfolio investments and pen-
sion funds, or completing the full deregulation of stock exchanges. Source: IMF (Abiad
et al., 2008).
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B Proofs
Proof of Lemma 2. We prove the lemma by contradiction. Assume that pt > 1. Then,
liquidity is dominated by capital. This means that impatient individuals would like to sell
their holdings of capital in the secondary market, but there would be nobody there to buy,
and the price would go to zero. This is evidently a contradiction. Assume now that pt < 1,
so that, contrary to the previous case, capital is dominated by liquidity. This means that
patient individuals would like to use their holdings of liquidity to buy capital, but there
would be no seller in the secondary market, and the price would go to infinity. This is again
a contradiction. 
Proof of Corollary 1. We prove the first part of the corollary by contradiction. Assume
that the liquidity ratio ≤π. Divide both sides of (11) by wt and derive:
Lpit (1− Lt)
1−pi = Ψ
[
1−
ξ
wt
]
. (20)
Define:
Φ ≡
Lpit (1− Lt)
1−pi
πpi(1− π)1−pi
≤ 1,
because Lt ≤ π. Rearranging (20), we obtain:
wt =
ξ
1− Φ(1− τ)1−pi
≤ w∗,
where we also used the definition of Ψ. This contradicts assumption 1, thus it cannot be true.
Now for the second part of the corollary. By definition, the liquidity ratio is decreasing if
Kt+1 grows at a higher rate that wt. Take the total differential of Kt+1, i.e.
dKt+1
dt =
∂Kt+1
∂wt
dwt
dt .
Then, the instantaneous growth rate of capital is:
gK ≡
dKt+1
dt
Kt+1
=
∂Kt+1
∂wt
dwt
dt
wt
wt
1
Kt+1
=
∂Kt+1
∂wt
wt
Kt+1
gw
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Hence, gK > gw if ∂Kt+1∂wt
wt
Kt+1
> 1. Using the implicit function theorem, this becomes:
Ψ
wt
Kt+1
> (1− π)Ψ
wt − ξ
Kt+1
+ π
(
Kt+1
wt −Kt+1
)1−pi [ wt
Kt+1
− 1
]
0 > −Ψ
ξ
Kt+1
− πΨ
wt − ξ
Kt+1
+ π
(
Kt+1
wt −Kt+1
)−pi
0 > −Ψ
ξ
Kt+1
which is always true.
Finally, we move to the third part of the corollary. At infinity, the right hand side of (20)
is equal to Ψ. Define:
f(Lt) ≡ L
pi
t (1− Lt)
1−pi −Ψ.
Notice that f(Lt) is strictly concave, f(0) = −Ψ = f(1), L
∗
t ≡ max f(Lt) = π and:
f(L∗t ) = π
pi(1− π)1−pi
[
1−
(
1
1− τ
)1−pi]
< 0
because τ < 1. Thus, there is no solution. 
Proof of Lemma 3. Attach multipliers λ1t and λ2t to (13) and (14), respectively. The first
order conditions give u′(Xtt ) = λ1t = u
′(Ctt) and u
′(Xtt+1) = λ2t = u
′(Ctt+1), which simplify
to the result. 
Proof of Proposition 2. Attach multipliers λ1t and λ2t to (16) and (17), respectively. The
first order conditions read:
Ctt : πu
′(Ctt ) = λ1t, (21)
Ctt+1 : (1− π)u
′(Ctt+1) = λ2t, (22)
φt : λ1t
[
ctt − (wt − ξ)
]
= λ2t
[
Rrt+1(wt − ξ)− c
t
t+1
]
. (23)
Plugging (21) and (22) into (23), we derive (18). For the characterization of the banking
equilibrium, see section 4.4. 
30
C Tables and Figures
Table 1: Bank Liquidity Ratio and Market Participation: Direct Effect
Dep. variable: log(liqratio) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Securities Markets Policy (SMP) -0.246*** -0.257*** -0.208*** -0.161*** -0.171***
(-3.543) (-3.722) (-3.471) (-2.703) (-2.813)
(Log of) Real GDP -0.638** -0.700*** -0.786*** -0.754***
(-2.498) (-3.271) (-3.727) (-3.512)
Financial Openness 0.0389 0.0478* 0.0507*
(1.402) (1.750) (1.841)
Credit Controls -0.202*** -0.197***
(-5.024) (-4.830)
Banking Supervision -0.0477
(-0.811)
Constant -1.567*** 3.546* 4.089** 4.714*** 4.602***
(-7.482) (1.724) (2.387) (2.794) (2.586)
Observations 739 737 716 716 716
Number of countries 45 45 45 45 45
R-squared 0.086 0.096 0.146 0.179 0.180
t-statistics in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Country and year effects included.
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Table 2: Bank Liquidity Ratio and Market Participation: Nonlinear and Interacted Effects
Dep. variable: log(liqratio) (1) (2) (3)
SMP==1 0.142 0.131
(1.581) (1.469)
SMP==2 -0.272** -0.269**
(-2.077) (-2.070)
SMP==3 -0.430** -0.429**
(-2.238) (-2.252)
(Log of) Real GDP -0.693*** -0.661***
(-3.271) (-3.129)
(Log of) Real GDP * SMP==1 0.0160
(1.394)
(Log of) Real GDP * SMP==2 -0.0382**
(-2.346)
(Log of) Real GDP * SMP==3 -0.0571**
(-2.517)
Constant -1.533*** 3.983** 3.743**
(-8.918) (2.350) (2.141)
Observations 716 716 716
Number of countries 45 45 45
R-squared 0.193 0.206 0.212
t-statistics in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Country and year effects included as controls.
Other financial liberalization variables included as controls.
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Figure 1: Liquid assets of the U.S. financial businesses as a percentage of total liabilities.
Liquid assets are defined as the sum of vault cash, reserves and Treasury securities. Source:
Flow of Funds Accounts of the United States.
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Figure 2: Liquid assets of the U.S. financial businesses as a percentage of total financial assets.
Liquid assets are defined as the sum of vault cash, reserves and Treasury securities. Source:
Flow of Funds Accounts of the United States.
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Figure 3: Relative price of liquidity with respect market prices. The relative price of liq-
uidity is calculated as the ratio between the compounded returns (base date: 1940) on the
S&P500 and on a 10-year U.S. Treasury bond. Source: Aswath Damodaran, available at:
http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/˜adamodar/.
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
20
Figure 4: Sterling liquid assets relative to total asset holdings of UK banking sector. Source:
Bank of England.
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Figure 5: Bank liquid reserves to bank assets ratio (%).
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Figure 6: The evolution of the total capital and of the liquidity ratio in the Unconstrained
Banking Equilibrium, with CRRA felicity function and RRA > 1.
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Figure 7: The evolution of the total capital and of the liquidity ratio in the Constrained
Banking Equilibrium.
36
0 50 100 150 200 250
0
0.5
1
φ t
Panel A: Participation Rate
0 50 100 150 200 250
0.21
0.215
0.22
L
t
Panel B: Bank Liquidity Ratio
0 50 100 150 200 250
0
0.5
1
k
M t+
1
/
K
t+
1
Panel C: Equity Capital (% of Total Capital)
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Figure 8: Equilibrium with Financial Lotteries
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